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Cybersecurity, which includes the security of information
technology (IT), is critical to ensuring that society trusts, and
therefore can benefit from, modern technology. Problematically,
though, rarely a day goes by without a news story related to how
critical data has been exposed, exfiltrated, or otherwise
inappropriately used or accessed as a result of supply chain
vulnerabilities. From the Russian government’s campaign to
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election to the September
2017 Equifax breach of more than 140 million Americans’ credit
reports, cyber risk has become a topic of conversation in
boardrooms and the White House, on Wall Street and main street.
But these discussions often miss the problems replete in the
expansive supply chains on which many of these products and
services we depend on are built; this is particularly true in the
medical device context. The problem recently made national news
with the voluntary recall of more than 400,000 pacemakers that
were found to be vulnerable to hackers, necessitating a firmware
update. This Article explores the myriad vulnerabilities in the
supply chain for medical devices, investigates existing FDA
cybersecurity and privacy regulations to identify any potential
governance gaps, and suggests a path forward to boost
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cybersecurity due diligence for manufacturers by making use of
new approaches and technologies, including blockchain.
I.
II.
III.
IV.

V.

VI.

Introduction ....................................................................406
Key Issues in Securing the Internet of Healthcare .......409
How Blockchain Technology Can Improve Supply Chain
Management and Security .............................................414
Medical Device Case Study ............................................421
A. Overview of Modern Pacemaker Systems.............. 423
B. Pacemaker Security Vulnerabilities ...................... 427
C. FDA Regulation of Medical Devices ....................... 429
D. HIPAA Security Rule .............................................. 437
E. Federal Trade Commission Enforcement .............. 438
Implications for Managers and Policymakers ...............439
A. A Look at Medical Industry Cybersecurity Best
Practices .................................................................. 440
B. AdvaMed Illustrative Example .............................. 448
C. Eskenazi Experience ............................................... 450
D. A Global Note .......................................................... 451
Conclusion .......................................................................453
I.

INTRODUCTION

Cybersecurity, including the security of information
technology (IT), is critical to ensuring that society trusts, and
therefore can benefit from, modern technology. Problematically,
though, rarely a day goes by without a news story related to how
critical data has been exposed, exfiltrated, or otherwise
inappropriately used or accessed resulting in that trust being
undermined. From the Russian government’s campaign to
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election1 to the September
2017 Equifax breach of more than 140 million Americans’ credit
reports,2 mitigating cyber risk has become a topic of
conversation in boardrooms and the White House, on Wall Street
and main street. This is increasingly the case, troublingly,
among healthcare providers as both small practices and clinics
1. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, Inside a 3-Year Russian
Campaign to Influence U.S. Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/russia-mueller-election.html.
2. Seena Greesin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09
/equifax-data-breach-what-do.
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and major hospitals have been recent targets of ransomware
campaigns. One variety, known as “Locky,” is among the “most
prolific types of ransomware” infecting, for example, the
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, resulting in “an
‘internal emergency.’”3
Despite the gravity of cyber risk facing healthcare providers
and patients, commentators seldom discuss an important source
of such risk: the often-expansive supply chains medical device
manufacturers depend upon.4 Manufacturers of devices such as
pacemaker systems purchase their components (e.g., microchips
and software libraries) from multiple suppliers. As the number
of such suppliers grows, so too does the number of opportunities
potential wrongdoers can exploit. As the old proverb goes, a
chain is only as strong as its weakest link. The problem recently
made national news when the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) suggested a voluntary recall of more than 400,000
pacemakers that were found to be vulnerable to hackers,
necessitating a firmware update.5 This Article explores the
vulnerabilities replete in the supply chain for medical devices,
investigates both existing FDA cybersecurity and privacy
regulations as well as industry codes of conduct to identify any
potential governance gaps, and suggests a path forward to boost
3. Charlie Osborne, Locky Ransomware Used to Target Hospitals Evolves,
ZDNET (Nov. 7, 2017, 9:00 AM PST), http://www.zdnet.com/article/lockyransomware-used-to-target-hospitals-evolves/.
4. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Software Has a Serious Supply-Chain
Security Problem, WIRED (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story
/ccleaner-malware-supply-chain-software-security?mbid=nl_091817_daily
&CNDID=%25%25CUST_ID%25%25 (explaining that consumers often hear
warnings about websites or attachments in emails but are rarely warned about
issues “further up the software supply chain”).
5. See Press Release, FDA, Firmware Update to Address Cybersecurity
Vulnerabilities Identified in Abbott’s (Formerly St. Jude Medical’s) Implantable
Cardiac Pacemakers: FDA Safety Communication (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm573669.htm
[hereinafter Firmware Update]. However, some, such as Professor Kevin Fu
have questioned the veracity of these claims. See Eliza Strickland, Expert
Questions Claim that St. Jude Pacemaker Was Hacked, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept.
2, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/biomedical/devices/werepacemakers-from-st-jude-medical-really-hacked; see also Lars Noah, Turn the
Beat Around: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-Assist Devices, 39 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1229, 1243 (2013) (investigating pacemaker vulnerabilities);
W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421,
461 (2017) (“FDA has expressed some interest in expanding this approach to
some medical software, describing in mid-2017 a possible program where
trusted software developers could face lighter premarket security.”).
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cybersecurity due diligence for manufacturers by making use of
new approaches and technologies, including blockchain.
Myriad vulnerabilities exist in securing the Internet of
Healthcare, from the 3D printing of medical devices6 to foreign
nation states interested in personal health records.7 The
problem is far too broad to meaningfully explore in a single
article, underscoring the need for additional research in this
area. To help narrow our investigation, we focus on the
suitability of blockchain technology to help: (1) promote
cybersecurity due diligence in vulnerable supply chains, and (2)
better secure and anonymize health records. The investigation
is structured as follows. Part I summarizes security issues facing
the Internet of Healthcare, including the literature on the
“Internet of Bodies,” before focusing on supply chain concerns.
Part II analyzes how blockchain technology can help address
these security lapses. Part III reviews the lifecycle of a particular
medical device—a pacemaker—and reviews the applicable
federal and state cybersecurity requirements on manufacturers
and hospitals using this device, along with how the Advanced
Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed) is helping to create
a cybersecurity code of conduct for industry. Part III also dives
into the experience of one hospital, Eskenazi Health in
Indianapolis, Indiana, to see how its administrators have
implemented various safeguards to better secure their systems.
Finally, Part IV focuses on implications for managers and
policymakers interested in promoting cybersecurity due
diligence in the healthcare industry. Ultimately, we propose that
blockchain is a useful tool to help healthcare providers and
manufactures mitigate certain supply chain and security risks
but only as part of a larger universe of reforms needed to secure
the Internet of Healthcare.

6. See, e.g., Press Release, FDA, Statement by FDA Commissioner Scott
Gottlieb, M.D., on FDA Ushering in New Era of 3D Printing of Medical
Products; Provides Guidance to Manufacturers of Medical Devices (Dec. 4,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements
/ucm587547.htm (discussing the FDA’s work to regulate innovative medical
technology, including 3D printing).
7. See, e.g., Drew Harwell & Ellen Nakashima, China Suspected in Major
Hacking of Health Insurer, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/investigators-suspect-china-may-beresponsible-for-hack-of-anthem/2015/02/05/25fbb36e-ad56-11e4-9c91e9d2f9fde644_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c7992683386c.
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II. KEY ISSUES IN SECURING THE INTERNET OF
HEALTHCARE
It is easy to summon up a potential “parade of horribles”
when considering the myriad risks to the Internet of Healthcare
generally, or the Internet of Medical Devices in particular.
According to Zach Rothstein of the trade group AdvaMed, the
scale and gravity of such risks is an open and “very loaded
question.”8 Ben Esslinger, a clinical engineer at Eskenazi
Health, agrees: “Cybersecurity is an emergency management
issue. This is an epidemic in which vulnerabilities are being
exploited, and it can directly impact patient care.”9 But what
sorts of vulnerabilities concern hospital administrators and
medical device manufacturers most? Everything from issues
with integrating multiple devices and sensors with different
operating systems, which at times are no longer being patched
with security updates, to protecting vital systems from
ransomware campaigns.10 Privacy concerns can also complicate
both the extent and manner in which data is stored on these
disparate devices.11
To help balance security and privacy concerns in the
healthcare setting, most organizations have adopted a riskmanagement approach, such as the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework
(CSF).12 However, it is difficult to reduce risk in the realm of

8. Interview with Zach Rothstein, AdvaMed, in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
22, 2018); see About AdvaMed, ADVAMED, https://www.advamed.org/aboutadvamed (last visited Feb. 16, 2018) (“The Advanced Medical Technology
Association (AdvaMed), is a trade association that leads the effort to advance
medical technology in order to achieve healthier lives and healthier economies
around the world. AdvaMed’s membership has reached nearly 300 members
and more than 80 employees with a global presence in countries including
Europe, India, China, Brazil, and Japan.”).
9. Interview with Ben Esslinger, Clinical Engineer, Eskenazi Health, in
Indianapolis, Ind. (Jan. 23, 2018).
10. See HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, REPORT ON
IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 2, 28 (2017),
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/CyberTF/Documents/report2017.
pdf.
11. Id. at 9–11.
12. For more on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, see Scott J.
Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring
the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping
Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 305 (2015).
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medical information technology. Reasons for this include: (1)
differing regulatory regimes of devices, as explored in Part III;
(2) complicated systems of device use that include both
physicians and patients as well as hospital IT groups; (3) the
personal and private nature of many of the pieces of information
that these devices can collect, broadcast, and manipulate; (4)
lethal or otherwise catastrophic failure modes for some of these
devices; and (5) unique constraints on computational ability and
power due to the need for a device to be portable and possibly
even embedded in a person for medical reasons.13 Yet, despite
these risks, the medical industry has been criticized for not being
at the cybersecurity vanguard, as evidenced by the fact that
many devices are now known to be susceptible to attacks.14
Although evangelist groups such as “I Am The Cavalry” have
been trying to publicize the issue for several years, the public
has only just begun to appreciate these problems.15 The recent
ransomware attacks on the U.K.’s health system16 seem to have
raised the profile of the issue. Hollywood has also taken note: the
show “Grey’s Anatomy” recently featured a two-part episode
about a hospital that succumbs to a combination of malware and
ransomware.17
We next consider why cybersecurity risk reduction has been
difficult in settings outside of healthcare, and explore why these
problems may be further exacerbated in the medical field. The
chief problems include: supply chain concerns, patching,
management, and design. First, we need to consider the patient

18.

13. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 8–16,

14. See Patrick Nohe, The Healthcare Industry Is Lagging Behind on
Cybersecurity, SSL STORE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.thesslstore.com/blog
/healthcare-industry-cybersecurity-2018/ (citing a 2018 Security Scorecard
report that ranks the healthcare industry “fifteenth in terms of cybersecurity
health when compared to 17 other major U. S. industries”); see also Firmware
Update, supra note 5.
15. I Am the Cavalry, I AM CAVALRY, https://www.iamthecavalry.org/ (last
visited Jan. 16, 2018) (explaining that “I Am The Cavalry” is a global grassroots
organization which focuses on the intersection of computer security and human
life).
16. NHS ‘Could Have Prevented’ WannaCry Ransomware Attack, BBC
(Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41753022.
17. Grey’s Anatomy: Out of Nowhere, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com
/title/tt7043730/?ref_=ttep_ep8 (last visited Apr. 8, 2018); Grey’s Anatomy: 1800-799-7233, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt7043736/?ref_=ttep_ep9 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2018).
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as part of the supply chain, which is admittedly a difficult
undertaking given how complex these systems already are. The
manufacturing process for Apple’s iPhone, for example, involves
dozens of suppliers, all of which are shipping, assembling, and
warehousing components before the final product is delivered to
an Apple store, or your door.18 However, the limited runs for
medical devices, at least when compared to the large runs that
major corporations such as Apple and Amazon use for consumer
devices, incentivize the reuse of commercial off-the-shelf
hardware and software components whenever possible, and
presumably the lowest cost supplier will win any bids for
components.19 This may make medical devices more susceptible
to attacks such as by supply chain components having embedded
malware.20 The applicability of blockchain to help address
supply chain issues is discussed in Part II.
The practice of installing patches on FDA-approved devices
has a rocky history. Initially, manufacturers were unclear as to
whether patching a device for security reasons necessitated a
recertification under FDA guidelines, as is discussed further in
Part III. In 2016, the FDA clarified that patching for
cybersecurity that did not significantly affect the operation of a

18. See Ian Barker, The Global Supply Chain Behind the iPhone 6, BETA
NEWS,
https://betanews.com/2014/09/23/the-global-supply-chain-behind-theiphone-6/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). All of these steps introduce numerous
opportunities for security problems to arise; recent research has even suggested
hackers could use smartphone apps to destroy manufacturing equipment or
even destroy entire factories. See Martin Giles, Hackers Could Blow Up
Factories Using Smartphone Apps, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609946/hackers-could-blow-up-factoriesusing-smartphone-apps/. Similar research was also published in an online
article. See Scott J. Shackelford, Guarding Against the Possible Spectre in Every
Machine, CONVERSATION (Jan. 22, 2018), https://theconversation.com
/guarding-against-the-possible-spectre-in-every-machine-89825.
19. See Bill Graham, Reducing the Risk of the Software Supply Chain in
Medical Devices, GRAMMATECH BLOG, http://blogs.grammatech.com/reducingthe-risk-of-the-software-supply-chain-in-medical-devices (explaining that static
analysis is one way to limit the risks of using third-party software).
20. See, e.g., Fahmida Y. Rashid, HP’s Malware-Laden Switches Illustrate
Supply Chain Risks, PC MAG. (Apr. 12, 2012), https://securitywatch.pcmag
.com/pc-hardware/296547-hp-s-malware-laden-switches-illustrate-supplychain-risks (discussing an example of a supply chain issue that occurred during
the production of HP Switches, the switches were shipped with infected SD
cards that could pose a risk to computers if they were repurposed).
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medical device did not require recertification.21 Although this
guidance has eased concerns, secure patching remains
problematic for several reasons. First, because many devices are
not consistently connected to the Internet, automatic patch
download and deployment, which is standard for modern
operating systems, is not an option.22 Second, some devices need
specialized medical equipment or medical practitioners to be
present for the patch to be applied. For example, pacemakers are
embedded in the patient and need specialized radios to transmit
updates; further, limited battery lives may limit the number of
times one can perform a power-hungry update process.23 Third,
the embedded nature of some medical devices means that they
need to last a lifetime on a single battery and make the most
efficient use of power possible. This can imply that traditional
security means for ensuring the integrity and legitimacy of a
patch cannot be deployed on some devices.24
Yet another problematic aspect of patching medical devices
is two-fold: long service lifespans combined with the inclusion of
embedded non-programmable firmware. Currently, such longlived IT systems in nonmedical fields suffer from being
vulnerable to long-known vulnerabilities that can be exploited
by hackers since these devices cannot be easily reprogrammed,
and thus patched, due to their embedded firmware.25 While
security is achieved in many subsystems by replacing the item
with a newer version of the product, this is not a suitable
strategy for implanted medical devices such as pacemakers,
discussed in Part III. Inconveniently, however, replacing a
vulnerable device is sometimes the only solution. The recently
21. See FDA, POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL
DEVICES
9
(2016),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices
/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm482022.pdf.
22. See Nourhene Ellouze et al., Security of Implantable Medical Devices:
Limits, Requirements, and Proposals, 7 SECURITY COMM. NETWORKS 2475,
2476–79
(2014),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/sec.939
(explaining that due to power consumption limitations, fixes to security issues
in implanted medical devices can be challenging).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Jeff Kampman, AMD Says CTS Labs Vulnerabilities Can Be
Patched with New Firmware, TECH. REP. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://techreport
.com/news/33400/amd-says-cts-labs-vulnerabilities-can-be-patched-with-newfirmware; Kim Zetter, Why Firmware Is So Vulnerable to Hacking, and What
Can Be Done About It, WIRED (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/02
/firmware-vulnerable-hacking-can-done/.
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discovered “Spectre” and “Meltdown” hardware bugs affecting
nearly all CPUs, for instance, can only be entirely eliminated
when affected chipsets eventually fall out of use. Replacing an
implanted medical device affected by a hardware bug is not so
easily done.26
Beyond the challenges of patching software, medical devices
require routine maintenance to ensure proper functioning,
including accuracy, security, and privacy. This presents some
distinct challenges. Managing medical devices often requires
specialized medical knowledge, for instance. Moreover, several
independent groups are frequently necessary to properly
manage such devices when compared to non-medical systems.
The groups who need to manage a device may include: (1) the
device manufacturer, (2) a technician at a hospital or clinic, (3)
the physician, (4) a home care assistant or nursing staff, and (5)
the patient. Many of these groups will have differing educations,
technical and medical backgrounds, and knowledge of the
patient’s status. Increasing the number of individuals with
which a system needs to interact in order to function properly,
all of whom frequently have different security and privacy
classifications, adds significant design requirements and
constraints and makes constructing such systems more difficult,
and thus more susceptible to attacks.27 Further, as previously
mentioned, many of these devices will not have consistent
Internet access, preventing them from being continuously
monitored and updated as necessary. The lack of such live
connection also limits the ability to centralize management, a
technique that has successfully been used to improve security
postures on devices while driving down maintenance costs.28
A large number of traditional computer networking and
defense techniques become unusable or problematic in health
settings. We provide two examples. First, recently a court
subpoenaed the audit logs on an individual’s pacemaker in
26. See Shackelford, supra note 18; Lily Hay Newman, Medical Devices Are
the Next Security Nightmare, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com
/2017/03/medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/.
27. See Jeff Clark, Is Complexity the Downfall of IT Security?, DATA CTR. J.
(Feb.
3,
2015),
http://www.datacenterjournal.com/complexity-downfallsecurity/.
28. See Antone Gonsalves, Plans to Centralize Cybersecurity with DHS
Seen as Step Forward, CSO (July 25, 2013), https://www.csoonline.com/article
/2133770/malware-cybercrime/plans-to-centralize-cybersecurity-with-dhsseen-as-step-forward.html.
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relation to an arson case.29 Should this practice become
widespread, one can expect that consumers will insist on devices
with limited or no logs in order to maintain their privacy.
Second, embedded medical devices that have wireless radios
such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi may have unique identifiers built into
the radio system that are broadcast on a continuous basis as part
of the underlying radio protocol. Such identifiers are prolific and
allow individuals to be tracked and geo-located through a
number of different techniques. While this might be acceptable
in a standard IT device that can be chosen not to be used, it is
ethically more problematic on a device that must be worn.30
In general, though, Rothstein reports that AdvaMed views
healthcare cybersecurity as a “shared responsibility,” which
resonates with the growing sentiment with regards to the utility
of treating cybersecurity not just as an exercise in cost-benefit
analysis, but as a social responsibility.31 Moreover, Rothstein
reports some success in working with various partners toward
this common goal, but challenges remain:
Even if manufactures put the best security in place, if other parts of
the system are insecure, these efforts might not matter. It has to be a
joint effort, meaning that all players from designers to patients need
to be involved. But getting all the players on the same page and
working together is the toughest part.32

III. HOW BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY CAN IMPROVE
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY
The beginning of 2018 brought news that highlighted a
longtime concern for security researchers: technological
vulnerabilities can be rooted in hardware as well as software.
Indeed, the hardware at the heart of nearly every computer,
smartphone, tablet and other electronic device is flawed in at

29. See Paul Rosenzweig, The Tell-Tale Heart, LAWFARE (July 14, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tell-tale-heart.
30. See Meghnan Neal, The Internet of Bodies Is Coming, and You Could
Get Hacked, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 13, 2014), https://motherboard.vice.com
/en_us/article/gvyqgm/the-internet-of-bodies-is-coming-and-you-could-gethacked.
31. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford et al., Sustainable
Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber
Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1995 (2016).
32. Interview with Zach Rothstein, supra note 8.
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least two significant ways.33 The newly discovered flaws,
nicknamed “Meltdown” and “Spectre,” are chip-based
weaknesses that let one user of a computer spy on other users—
even if they are using shared computer systems providing
Internet services to large numbers of people, like iCloud,
Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud Platform or Microsoft
Azure.34 Chip companies and computer firms are working to fix
the vulnerabilities, but the repairs can reportedly slow down
computers and mobile devices by as much as thirty percent.35
Corporate and academic researchers are still investigating how
the problems were created, and how they persisted, unfound and
unfixed, through more than twenty years of chip innovation.36
Regardless of their cause, the pertinent fact is that too few firms
are adequately securing their supply chains.37
It is widely known that hackers can gain access to computer
systems by exploiting software vulnerabilities or though “social
engineering,” such as phishing schemes and other ruses.38 But
another avenue of attack is by altering circuits that, like lines of

33. See Meltdown and Spectre, https://spectreattack.com/ (last visited Apr.
13, 2018); Michael Simon, Meltdown and Spectre CPU Flaws Affect All iOS and
Mac Devices, but Don’t Panic, MAC WORLD (Jan. 5, 2018),
https://www.macworld.com/article/3245778/apple-phone/apple-meltdownspectre-cpu-flaws-statement.html; What Are Spectre and Meltdown CPU
Vulnerabilities
and
Are
You
Affected?,
WINDOWS
CLUB,
http://www.thewindowsclub.com/what-is-spectre-and-meltdown-vulnerabilities
(last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
34. See Joshua Long, Meltdown and Spectre: What Apple Users Need to
Know, MAC SEC. BLOG (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.intego.com/mac-securityblog/meltdown-and-spectre-what-apple-users-need-to-know/.
35. See Patrick Howell O’Neill, Industry Braces for Critical Intel Security
Flaw Impacting a Decade’s Worth of Chips, CYBER SCOOP (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://www.cyberscoop.com/intel-chip-flaw-virtual-memory-microsoftwindows-linux/.
36. See Andy Greenberg, Triple Meltdown: How So Many Researchers
Found a 20-Year-Old Chip Flaw at the Same Time, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/meltdown-spectre-bug-collision-intel-chip-flawdiscovery/.
37. See Dave Lewis, Digital Supply Chain (In)Security, FORBES (July 28,
2014, 6:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davelewis/2014/07/28/digitalsupply-chain-insecurity/#628e15933869.
38. See, e.g., Arun Vishwanath, ‘Spearphishing’ Roiled the Presidential
Campaign – Here’s How to Protect Yourself, CONVERSATION (Nov. 8, 2016),
https://theconversation.com/spearphishing-roiled-the-presidential-campaignheres-how-to-protect-yourself-68274.
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code, most users will never see.39 These physical devices that are
the foundation of the complex supply chains involved in most
high-tech manufacturing are very hard to secure, as was
introduced in Part I.40 Each link in a supply chain highlights
opportunities for hackers to exploit, which could damage
equipment or even disable factories.41 But not all supply chain
threats are malicious; sophisticated retailers like Amazon, for
example, have been fooled by counterfeits.42 In 2015, Lenovo
installed advertising software on its computers, dangerously
weakening system security.43 But the focus here is on malicious
supply chain vulnerabilities, as was highlighted in 2012 when
Microsoft warned customers that Chinese computer factories
were installing malware on PCs before they even left the
production line.44
As the Internet of Everything expands, the growing scale of
the threat from hackers could easily be eclipsed by excitement
over lower costs and smarter tech.45 A classic example of this

39. See Andy Greenberg, This ‘Demonically Clever’ Backdoor Hides in a
Tiny Slice of a Computer Chip, WIRED (June 1, 2016), https://www.wired.com
/2016/06/demonically-clever-backdoor-hides-inside-computer-chip/.
40. See Barker, supra note 18.
41. See Martin Giles, Hackers Could Blow Up Factories Using Smartphone
Apps, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s
/609946/hackers-could-blow-up-factories-using-smartphone-apps/.
42. See Ari Levy, Amazon’s Chinese Counterfeit Problem Is Getting Worse,
CNBC (July 8, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinesecounterfeit-problem-is-getting-worse.html.
43. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The ‘Internet of Things’ Is Sending Us Back
to the Middle Ages, CONVERSATION (Sept. 5, 2017), https://theconversation.com
/the-internet-of-things-is-sending-us-back-to-the-middle-ages-81435; Elizabeth
Weise, FTC Settles with Lenovo over a Built-in Snooping Software, $3.5 Million
Fine, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech
/2017/09/05/ftc-settles-lenovo-over-built-snooping-software-scanned-userscomputers/632775001/.
44. See Malware Being Installed on Computers in Supply Chain, Warns
Microsoft, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2012/sep/14/malware-installed-computers-factories-microsoft.
45. See Carl Franzen, How to Find a Hack-Proof Baby Monitor, OFFSPRING
(Aug. 4, 2017), https://offspring.lifehacker.com/how-to-find-a-hack-proof-babymonitor-1797534985; John Markoff, Why Light Bulbs May Be the Next Hacker
Target, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03
/technology/why-light-bulbs-may-be-the-next-hacker-target.html?_r=0; Charlie
Osborne, Smartwatch Security Fails to Impress: Top Devices Vulnerable to
Cyberattack, ZDNET (July 22, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/smartwatchsecurity-fails-to-impress-top-devices-vulnerable-to-cyberattack/; Aaron Tilley,
How Hackers Could Use a Nest Thermostat as an Entry Point into Your Home,
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trend happened in 2009 when the U.S. Department of Defense
bought 2,200 Sony PlayStation 3 gaming consoles to use as
components in a military supercomputer under the commercial
off-the-shelf program.46 But many of those systems were
manufactured abroad, making it difficult to verify that they were
not tampered with prior to their integration into critical U.S.
infrastructure.47
The Navy, at least, has learned from this mistake. The
Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division, which is the third
largest naval base in the world spread across more than 100
square miles of Southern Indiana, has pioneered automated
inspections, using artificial intelligence to examine digital
pictures of new circuit boards to detect unauthorized
alterations.48 The U.S. is rightly concerned about falling victim
to this sort of attack—in part, because U.S. government agencies
conduct them. Leaked documents have shown how the National
Security Agency’s Tailored Access Operations team routinely
intercepts shipments of new computer and networking
equipment.49 Then, NSA workers modify the hardware to add
vulnerabilities and secret access for NSA hackers to use later,
and then put the equipment back in boxes to be delivered.50
As explained in the Introduction and Part I, one new way to
secure supply chains involves blockchain technology—a secure
database system stored and maintained across many computers
FORBES (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2015/03/06
/nest-thermostat-hack-home-network/#235d0d693986.
46. See Rosa Golijan, Department of Defense Buys 2,200 PS3s to Upgrade
Supercomputer, GIZMODO (Nov. 29, 2009), https://gizmodo.com/5414938
/department-of-defense-buys-2200-ps3s-to-upgrade-supercomputer.
47. See Scott J. Shackelford, How to Enhance Cybersecurity and Create
American Jobs, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost
.com/scott-j-shackelford/how-to-enhance-cybersecurity_b_1673860.html.
48. Press Release, Joe Donnelly, U.S. Senator for Ind., Donnelly Meets with
NSWC Crane Expert, Praises Crane as a Leader in Protecting Country’s
Critical Weapons and Cyber Systems Against Counterfeit Parts (Oct. 27, 2015),
https://www.donnelly.senate.gov/newsroom/press/donnelly-meets-with-nswccrane-expert-praises-crane-as-a-leader-in-protecting-countrys-criticalweapons-and-cyber-systems-against-counterfeit-parts. DARPA has pioneered a
similar program utilizing blockchain tech. See Press Release, DARPA, DARPA
Technology Identifies Counterfeit Microelectronics (Sept. 30, 2014),
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2014-09-30.
49. Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 29,
2013),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerfultoolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html.
50. See id.
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around the internet—to track and verify all aspects of a
complicated supply chain like Apple’s. IBM and the
international shipping giant Maersk are experimenting with
using blockchain systems to better secure and transparently
track shipments, as well as automate payments.51 This is one of
the benefits of blockchain tech since the distributed smart
contracts that these systems generate are automatically
enforceable. Once a component part like a chip is delivered, for
example, a blockchain verifies that fact and the supplier
automatically is paid in dollars, or their cryptocurrency of choice.
For those who might recall it, the peer-to-peer file sharing
service Napster can be a useful onramp for understanding
blockchain;52 indeed, the service spawned an array of popular
services, from Skype to Spotify, as well as Bitcoin.53 What these
diverse companies have in common is that none of their
information is centrally archived; instead, they utilize, to a
greater or lesser extent, “global spreadsheet[s]” that leverages
peer-to-peer technology to authenticate transactions.54 Such a
system enables transparency, and thus trust, in distributed
systems that otherwise lack that invaluable feature.55 For
example, every 10 minutes, on average,56 all new Bitcoin
transactions are “verified, cleared, and stored in a block” that is,
in turn “linked to the preceding block, thereby creating a
51. Press Release, IBM, Maersk and IBM Unveil First Industry-Wide
Cross-Border Supply Chain Solution on Blockchain (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/51712.wss.
52. Lance Koonce, Are Blockchains the Second Coming of Napster?
(Perspective),
BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS.
(Jan.
18,
2017),
https://biglawbusiness.com/are-blockchains-the-second-coming-of-napsterperspective/; Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Revolution: How the
Technology Behind Bitcoin Is Changing Money, Business and the World, TIME
(May 6, 2016), http://time.com/4320254/blockchain-tech-behind-Bitcoin/.
53. Koonce, supra note 52. Spotify formerly used on peer-to-peer streaming
for certain users, but has since eliminated that function, and relies wholly on
server-based streaming. Romain Dillet, Spotify Removes Peer-to-Peer
Technology from Its Desktop Client, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 17, 2014),
https://techcrunch.com/2014/04/17/spotify-removes-peer-to-peer-technologyfrom-its-desktop-client/.
54. See Nolan Bauerle, How Does Blockchain Technology Work?, COINDESK
(last visited Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-doesblockchain-technology-work/.
55. Id.
56. See Joseph Bonneau, How Long Does It Take for a Bitcoin Transaction
to Be Confirmed?, COIN CENTER (Nov. 3, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry
/how-long-does-it-take-for-a-bitcoin-transaction-to-be-confirmed.
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chain.”57 Blocks that are not appropriately integrated are
deemed invalid.58 In time, such blockchains can become a “World
Wide Ledger of value.”59
But no blockchain, nor any system on which a blockchain
may be deployed, is one-hundred-percent secure; they are, for
example, still susceptible to hardware vulnerabilities like
Meltdown and Spectre.60 Moreover, in many ways blockchain is
even harder to apply in the medical device context than, say,
prescription drugs, given the complexity involved in these
supply chains, as has been noted, as well as potential nationstate motivations to compromise these devices,61 and the need
for continuous updating as was described in Part I.62 There are
also challenges with relying on this technology to help
anonymize patient data.63
At best, then, blockchain systems can be part of companies’
efforts to manage supply chain risks by making it much harder
to tamper with products and easier to trade inputs such as by
using RFID tags, as well as automating payment, warehousing,
transport and delivery.64 As an example of the kind of fraud that
57. Don Tapscott, Blockchain: The Ledger that Will Record Everything of
Value to Humankind, WORLD. ECON. FORUM (July 5, 2017), https://www
.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/blockchain-the-ledger-that-will-recordeverything-of-value/.
58. See Bauerle, supra note 54.
59. See Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Here’s Why Blockchains Will Change
the World, FORTUNE (May 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/08/whyblockchains-will-change-the-world/; see also Tapscott, supra note 57 (calling
blockgain a “new digital ledger to record anything of value to humankind”).
60. Edmund Lee, Why Blockchains Can Be Really Bad. Or: How TechnoFuturists Can Ruin Things, RECODE (June 19, 2016), https://www.recode.net
/2016/6/19/11972818/dao-hacked-blockchain-ethereum.
61. See, e.g., Patricia A.H. Williams & Andrew J. Woodward, Cybersecurity
Vulnerabilities in Medical Devices: A Complex Environment and Multifaceted
Problem, 8 MED. DEVICES 305, 305 (2015).
62. Sitting atop these complications is the fact that, in many instances,
incentives are not aligned for manufacturers to be forthcoming with regards to
potential security defects, with a potential cautionary tale taking the form of
the Volkswagen emissions scandal. See Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The
Scandal Explained, BBC (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business34324772.
63. See Mike Orcutt, Who Will Build the Health-Care Blockchain?, MIT
TECH. REV. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608821/whowill-build-the-health-care-blockchain/.
64. How Blockchain Can Transform the Supply Chain, LOGISTICS BUREAU
(Nov.
15,
2017),
http://www.logisticsbureau.com/how-blockchain-cantransform-the-supply-chain/.
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could be avoided by using blockchain, consider so-called
“fictitious pickups.”65 These happen when con artists show up at
a shipper’s dock, show faked identification documents, and take
a shipment. A blockchain would make it much harder for such a
scheme to succeed since it would require consent by all of the
users on the network.66 For example, in order for a delivery to
Indianapolis to be cleared, each participant in the chain would
have to affirmatively sign off on it by adding a new block to the
chain. But this is just the tip of the iceberg of what’s possible. As
reported by Steve Banker in Forbes, a firm called Kouvala
envisions a scheme whereby pallets fitted out with RFID tags
would ship themselves from A to B by advertising their needs.
Shipping firms would then bid for the right to ship the load, and
the pallet would, in effect, pick the best deal, which would be
tracked in a blockchain.67
To realize this dream, though, it is necessary to train people
to use blockchains and agree on standards for data
communication, encryption, and storage.68 And while such a
system would still face the problem of insider threats, the
underlying blockchain technology would make such attempts
more difficult.69 What is needed is an all-out effort to leverage
the work that leading organizations like Walmart,70 and the
Department of Defense, in particular the DARPA SHIELD
program, have accomplished, such as building out smart
contracts using blockchain to help crystallize industry best
practices.71 Public-private partnerships could start the process

65. Steve Banker, Blockchain in the Supply Chain: Too Much Hype,
FORBES (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevebanker/2017/09/01
/blockchain-in-the-supply-chain-too-much-hype/#7cfdf1c1198c.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. An effort is now underway to take these steps by the Blockchain
Governance Initiative, which is housed at the Indiana University Ostrom
Workshop. See New Ostrom Workshop Blockchain Governance Initiative,
OSTROM
WORKSHOP,
https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/resources/news
/180412-new-blockchain.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
69. Charlie Osborne, How Blockchain Technology Can Transform the
Security Industry, ZDNET (Sept. 4, 2017), http://www.zdnet.com/article/howblockchain-technology-can-transform-the-security-industry/.
70. Robert Hackett, Walmart and 9 Food Giants Team Up on IBM
Blockchain Plans, FORTUNE (Aug. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22
/walmart-blockchain-ibm-food-nestle-unilever-tyson-dole/.
71. See Kerry Bernstein, Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics
Defense (SHIELD), DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/supply-chain-
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of laying out appropriate standards to boost supply chain
security and help pave the way for blockchain to help us create
much more secure products, along with figuring out better ways
to measure, model, and insure against cyber-attacks targeting
hardware, such as pacemakers—the focus of the next Section.
IV. MEDICAL DEVICE CASE STUDY
This Part provides an in-depth view of how the current legal
and regulatory framework affects the security of implantable
pacemakers. We selected the pacemaker as the subject of this
case study, in part, because security vulnerabilities in such
devices have recently drawn widespread attention.72 Concerns
about pacemaker software vulnerabilities date to at least 2007,
when then-Vice President Dick Cheney deactivated some of the
wireless capabilities of his pacemaker out of concern for his
safety.73 Since then, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in pacemakers
have been widely documented. In early 2017, St. Jude, a leading
medical device manufacturer, patched a security vulnerability in
one of its pacemaker systems that reportedly could have allowed
attackers to drain the device’s battery, harmfully alter a
wearer’s heart pacing, or deliver electrical shocks.74 More
recently, an “exhaustive security evaluation of an implantable
cardiac device ecosystem” published by two researchers in 2017

hardware-integrity-for-electronics-defense (last visited Jan. 17, 2018);
Strengthening DOD Supply Chain Management, INNOVATEGOV (last visited
Jan. 17, 2018), http://innovategov.org/2015/03/19/strengthening-dod-supplychain-management/.
72. See, e.g., Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices
and Hospital Networks: Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 139 (2014); John G. Browning & Shawn Tuma, If Your Heart
Skips a Beat, It May Have Been Hacked: Cybersecurity Concerns with Implanted
Medical Devices, 67 S.C. L. REV. 637, 638 (2016); Eduard Marin et al., On the
(In)Security of the Latest Generation Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators and
How to Secure Them, PROC. 32ND ANNUAL CONF. ON COMPUTER SECURITY
APPLICATIONS 226 (2016), https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/publications
/article-2678.pdf.
73. See, e.g., U.S. Government Probes Medical Devices for Possible
Cyberflaws, 21 WESTLAW J. MED. DEVICES 4 (2014).
74. See, e.g., Tom Spring, St. Jude Patches Additional Cardiac Device,
THREAT POST (Feb. 7, 2017, 1:15PM), https://threatpost.com/st-jude-patchesadditional-cardiac-device/123596/; see also Newman, supra note 26; Firmware
Update, supra note 5.
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uncovered thousands of vulnerabilities and revealed
unencrypted patient data.75
This case study seeks to examine how well the current legal
framework reduces the risk of cybersecurity threats in
pacemakers, before moving on to discuss whether, and to what
extent, industry practices are helping to fill any governance
gaps.76 For that reason, the initial discussion focuses squarely
on the FDA’s efforts to (i) prevent the commercialization of
insecure devices, and (ii) prevent widespread harm to the public
if problems are uncovered in devices that are already on the
market. There are, of course, many other sources of law and
regulatory power that could be implicated after a cybersecurity
event has caused harm. For instance, personal identifying
information of pacemaker users could be exposed in a large-scale
security attack. Such an event could, in theory, lead to civil
liability for device manufacturers and possibly even hospitals
and doctors under laws governing disclosure of patient data.77
These topics are beyond the scope of this case study because
their primary function is backward-looking—that is, they
address harms that have already occurred, and do not
prospectively establish acceptable levels of risk to the public.
The following discussion opens with a brief explanation of what
pacemaker systems are, how they work, and the supply chains
that make these devices possible. With this technological and
industrial picture in place, the focus shifts to FDA regulation
and guidance before moving on to the HIPAA Security Rule and
relevant Federal Trade Commission (FTC) action.

75. See Dan Goodin, Radio-Controlled Pacemakers Aren’t as Hard to Hack
as You (May) Think, ARSTECHNICA (May 26, 2017), https://arstechnica.com
/information-technology/2017/05/radio-controlled-pacemakers-arent-as-hardto-hack-as-you-may-think/.
76. For more on the overall security threat landscape facing medical
devices, see generally Michael Woods, Cardiac Defribillators Need to Have a
Bulletproof Vest: The National Security Risk Posed by the Lack of Cybersecurity
in Implantable Medical Devices, 41 NOVA L. REV. 419, 419–27 (2017), which
discusses the cybersecurity risk for implantable medical devices.
77. See, e.g., The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA) 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2013) (precluding healthcare providers
from disclosing data such as names, zip codes, treatment dates, etc.).
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A. OVERVIEW OF MODERN PACEMAKER SYSTEMS
Pacemakers are widely used, remarkably reliable, and yet
so inconspicuous that they can easily be underappreciated.78 For
all their technological complexity, pacemakers rely upon a
simple principle: through a pair of conductive wires attached to
a user’s heart tissue, the device can sense abnormal heart
rhythms.79 In response, the device supplies a gentle and
carefully-timed electrical current to return the heart’s rhythm
back to normal. Simply put, a pacemaker is a computercontrolled metronome for the heart.80
Each year, millions of patients’ lives are saved by
pacemakers or implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICD).
According to 24/7 Wall Street, 235,567 peacemakers and 133,262
ICDs were implanted in the United States in 2009, and the
average cost of each procedure was $20,000 and $40,000,
respectively.81 The risks are low: infection occurs in one to two
percent of pacemaker surgeries and malfunctions involving the
conductive leads occur at a rate of about four percent.82 Concerns
over the security and privacy vulnerabilities in these devices
loom large, however.83
The technology that makes this elegant invention a reality
is complex, but the most important components and their

78. See, e.g., Amy Norton, More Americans Getting Pacemakers, REUTERS
(Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-more-americans-gettingpacemakers/more-americans-getting-pacemakers-idUSBRE88P1LN20120926
(reporting millions of pacemakers installed as of 2009). Leading manufacturers
of pacemakers include: Medtronic, St. Jude Medical (acquired by Abbott in
2017), Boston Scientific, Abbott Labs, Edwards Lifesciences, and Johnson &
Johnson.
79. Implantable Medical Devices, AM. HEART ASS’N, (Sept. 16, 2016),
http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/HeartAttack/TreatmentofaHear
tAttack/Implantable-Medical-Devices_UCM_303940_Article.jsp.
80. VINOD KUMAR KHANNA, IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL ELECTRONICS:
PROSTHETICS, DRUG DELIVERY, AND HEALTH MONITORING 267–70 (2016)
(discussing cardiac pacemakers) (“The main function of a typical pacemaker is
to detect and investigate the heartbeat of a person to find out if it is normal or
irregular.”).
81. Baxter Allen, The Eleven Most Implanted Medical Devices in America,
24/7 WALL ST. (July 18, 2011), https://247wallst.com/healthcare-economy/2011
/07/18/the-eleven-most-implanted-medical-devices-in-america.
82. Id.
83. William H. Maisel & Tadayoshi Kohno, Improving the Security and
Privacy of Implantable Medical Devices, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1164, 1164
(2010).

424

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 19:2

functions are easily understood.84 Pacemaker systems
(sometimes referred to as “ecosystems”85) are constellations of
devices, software, and services.86 At the center of a pacemaker
system is the implantable cardiac device.87 No larger than a
wristwatch, such machines contain small computer control
units, as well as software or firmware that detects abnormal
heart rhythms and generates the electrical pulses necessary to
restore normal rhythm.88 The implantable cardiac device also
contains an antenna for sending diagnostic data to the outside
world and for receiving commands.89 These devices are typically
powered by lithium/ion batteries and surgically installed
beneath a wearer’s skin.90

84. Pacemakers, first invented in 1950s, have been greatly improved in
their designs including smaller devices, longer lasting batteries, and more
sophisticated communication systems. The device has three main components:
a pulse generator with battery, one or more wires connecting the heart and the
pulse generator, and electrode on each wire. The pulse generator, supported by
a sealed lithium battery with an average eight years of life, produces electrical
impulses from a complex circuitry. And the wire carries the electrical impulses
between the heart and the generator, so the pacemaker can monitor and pace
the heart’s rhythm. Once the pacemaker has been implanted, physicians would
use a pacemaker programmer to test the device functionality and set patient
therapy parameters. See generally BILLY RIOS & JONATHAN BUTTS, SECURITY
EVALUATION OF THE IMPLANTABLE CARDIAC DEVICE ECOSYSTEM
ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION INTERDEPENDENCIES 4–5 (2017),
https://www.a51.nl/sites/default/files/pdf/Pacemaker%20Ecosystem%20Evalua
tion.pdf. A pacemaker programmer may vary from manufacturers to
manufactures but is a critical tool to monitor and even reprogram the
pacemaker. It communicates with the pacemaker via radio frequency (RF)
technology. Similarly, patients can also choose to remotely transmit their data
from their home monitoring device to clinical physicians and save their time to
clinic visits. The remote monitoring relies on a patient support network that
also allows vendors to register and upgrade the monitor device. Id. at 5.
85. Pacemakers and ICDs, together with physician programmers, home
monitoring device, and patient support network comprise an interdependent
implantable cardiac device ecosystem. Id. at 4.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., KHANNA, supra note 80.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 283 (discussing wireless sending and receiving of information via
antenna).
90. See, e.g., How Pacemakers Work, BOS. SCI., http://www.bostonscientific
.com/en-US/patients/about-your-device/pacemakers/how-pacemakerswork.html (last visited April 1, 2018).
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A second important component is called a “programmer.”91
In simple terms, a programmer is a computer that doctors use in
a clinical setting (e.g., a physician’s office) to wirelessly
communicate with an implanted cardiac device.92 Although
programmers are typically used to examine the functioning of a
patient’s heart, they also can be used to perform firmware
upgrades—i.e., to send new firmware and installation
commands to the computer control unit in an implanted cardiac
device.93
Patients and doctors can also monitor pacemaker data
outside of clinical settings with devices called “base stations.”94
Usually situated in a patient’s home, a base station retrieves
pacemaker data wirelessly from an implanted cardiac device,
and transmits it (e.g., over the internet using Wi-Fi or cellular
data connections) to a physician’s office.95 Often, the
transmission of this data is mediated by a dedicated patient
support network—an online service that routes pacemaker data
(including alerts indicating abnormal heart rhythm) to patients
and doctors.96
Since the first pacemakers were commercialized in the
1950s, the foregoing components have become smaller, more
complex, and consequently, more vulnerable to security attacks.
The recent introduction of smartphone apps to pacemaker
systems has increased such risks. These apps allow a standard
smartphone to function as a mobile base station that can retrieve
data directly from a pacemaker and send it to a doctor over the
internet.97

91. See KHANNA, supra note 80, at 284 (discussing programmers); see also
Marin et al., supra note 72, at 226–36 (discussing vulnerabilities in
programmers).
92. KHANNA, supra note 80, at 284; see also Preliminary Expert Report of
Carl D. Livitt at 3, 18, 25, St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Muddy Waters Consulting,
Case No. 0:16-cv-03002 (DWF/JSM) (D. Minn. Oct. 23, 2016) (discussing
exclusive use of programmer devices by physicians).
93. KHANNA, supra note 80, at 284.
94. See, e.g., Marin et al., supra note 72, at 226–36 (“ . . . base stations,
installed in the patients’ home, allow remote monitoring by gathering telemetry
data from the ICD and sending this data to the hospital.”).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See., e.g., MEDTRONIC, MyCarelink Smart U.S., http://www.medtronic
.com/us-en/mobileapps/patient-caregiver/mycarelink-smart-us.html
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2018).
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Pacemaker manufacturers rely on networks of suppliers for
many of the electronic components and software packages that
go into the devices they sell.98 The widely-publicized 2017
pacemaker security report mentioned earlier reveals, for
instance, off-the-shelf microprocessors used in home monitoring
base stations, software libraries supplied by third parties, and
removable third-party hard drives used in physician
programmers.99 Drawing on these examples and other publicly
available information, Figure 1 below depicts a hypothetical
pacemaker supply chain.

Figure 1: Hypothetical Pacemaker Supply Chain
Each rectangle in Figure 1 represents a unique company or
institution that supplies a component or material that
eventually is assembled and later packaged and sold by a
manufacturer. As is evident, although perhaps not as complex
and global as the supply chain for Apple’s iPhone referenced in
Part II, this manufacturing process still leaves plenty of space

98. Billy Rios & Jonathan Butts, Understanding Pacemaker Systems
Cybersecurity, WHITESCOPE IO (May 23, 2017), http://blog.whitescope.io
/2017/05/understanding-pacemaker-systems.html.
99. RIOS & BUTTS, supra note 84.
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for security vulnerabilities and, as a result, has becoming
increasingly regulated.
B. PACEMAKER SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
The device-to-device communications within a pacemaker
ecosystem and the inherent vulnerabilities underlying the
subsystems create security and privacy risks.100 Ideally,
manufacturers and vendors would implement robust safeguards
to balance safety, reliability, complexity, power consumption,
and cost. In reality, however, manufacturers have few incentives
to improve security mechanisms that might slow down
regulatory approval (discussed in the next sub-part).101 In 2017,
a report from WhiteScope highlighted industry-wide security
weaknesses with pacemaker programmers: the researchers
discovered over 8,000 vulnerabilities in outdated third-party
libraries from four programmers built by four different
vendors.102 Among a long list of flaws, researchers found that
pacemaker programmers do not authenticate to pacemaker
devices and can reprogram any pacemaker from the same
manufacturer; additionally, unencrypted patient data is stored
on the programmers.103 Focusing on radio-based (i.e., wireless)
attacks, in 2008 another group of researchers showed that an
unauthorized party equipped with a software radio within range
of an implanted cardiac device could launch a denial-of-service
attack, depleting the device’s battery and exposing unencrypted
patient information from RF signals.104
Although there have been some notable recalls of
implantable cardiac devices in recent years, the massive 2017
recall of Abbott Laboratories’ (formerly St. Jude Medical)
465,000 implanted pacemakers in the U.S. market is a stark
example of the potential harm that a cyberattack on medical

100. Id. at 21–22.
101. Wayne Burleson et al., Design Challenges for Secure Implantable
Medical Devices 1 (June 3–7, 2012), https://spqr.eecs.umich.edu/papers/49SS23_burleson.pdf (conference paper) (archived with the Security and Privacy
Research Group at the University of Michigan).
102. RIOS & BUTTS, supra note 84, at 13.
103. Id. at 20.
104. Daniel Halperin et al., Pacemaker and Implantable Cardiac
Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses, 2008 IEEE
SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 129, 136–38.

428

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 19:2

devices could do.105 On August 29, 2017, The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) released a safety communication
regarding the identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities in St. Jude
Medical’s pacemakers.106 In the notice, the FDA recognized that
as programmable medical devices become increasingly
networked, there is an increased risk of exploitation of
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.107 A related report published by
ICS-CERT, a special cybersecurity group within the Department
of Homeland Security, indicated three vulnerabilities related to
radio communications in the affected devices: (1) the
pacemaker’s authentication algorithm can be compromised or
bypassed; (2) the pacemakers do not restrict the number of
correctly formatted “RF wake-up” commands that can be
received; (3) some models of pacemakers transmit unencrypted
patient information to programmers and home monitoring
units.108 To exploit these vulnerabilities, an unauthorized user
would send radio signals to modify a pacemaker’s programming
commands, which would result in patient harm from rapid
battery depletion to inappropriate pacing.109
Fortunately, remedial steps have helped lower the risk of
harm to pacemaker users. The FDA approved St. Jude Medical’s
firmware update as a corrective action (recall) to ensure that it
addressed these vulnerabilities and reduced the risk of
exploitation.110 The firmware update will implement “RF wakeup” protections and limit the commands that can be issued to

105. Michael Mezher, Abbott Recalls 465,000 Pacemakers for Cybersecurity
Patch, REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.raps.org
/regulatory-focus™/news-articles/2017/8/abbott-recalls-465,000-pacemakersfor-cybersecurity-patch. In 2007, Medtronic, an industry leader, issued a global
recall of 235,000 Sprint Fidelis defibrillation leads because of the potential for
lead fractures and identified thirteen deaths possibly related to the product.
Thousands of product liability lawsuits ensued from the recall. Barry Meier,
Medtronic Links Device for Heart to 13 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/business/14device.html?module=ArrowsN
av&contentCollection=Business%20Day&action=keypress&region=FixedLeft
&pgtype=article.
106. See Firmware Update, supra note 5.
107. Id.
108. Abbott Laboratories’ Accent/Anthem, Accent MRI, Assurity/Allure, and
Assurity MRI Pacemaker Vulnerabilities, ICS-CERT (Aug. 29, 2017), https://icscert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-17-241-01.
109. Id.
110. Mezher, supra note 105.
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pacemakers via RF communications.111 In addition, the updated
pacemaker firmware will prevent unencrypted transmission of
patient information.112 But the firmware update has to be
applied during an in-person patient visit with a healthcare
provider via the Merlin PCS Programmer.113 As with any
firmware update, physicians are recommended to consider the
possible risk of an update malfunction along with the potential
risk of a cybersecurity attack.114 However, a replacement of
implanted pacemaker is not recommended.115 The FDA suggests
that the implementation of the firmware update should be
determined based on the physician’s professional judgment and
patient management considerations.116
The cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the St. Jude Medical’s
pacemakers may only reveal the tip of the iceberg. Designers in
the implantable cardiac medical devices often face trade-offs
between heightened cybersecurity posture and patient care
considerations, such as safety, utility, and cost of power
consumption.117 Manufactures, vendors, and the healthcare
industry writ large have not done enough to make their
ecosystem resilient to cyber risks.118 And they generally are not
willing to share with public the security measures they may
employ in their proprietary systems.119 The next section
investigates the potential of new regulations to address these
security and privacy concerns in implantable cardiac medical
devices.
C. FDA REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES
Established in 1906, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing
the safety of medical devices such as pacemakers.120 When
111. ICS-CERT, supra note 108.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Mezher, supra note 105.
116. ICS-CERT, supra note 108.
117. See generally Burleson et al., supra note 101.
118. See id. at 1.
119. See id. at 4.
120. In addition to the FDA, many state agencies also regulate their
distribution. See generally M. Elizabeth Bierman & Michele L. Buenafe, State
Regulation of Medical Device Distribution: Strategic Planning Needed to
Address Varying Requirements, FOOD & DRUG L. INST. UPDATE, May/June
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Congress granted the agency this authority in the 1930s,
however, the term “medical device” typically referred to
relatively simple tools used by doctors and surgeons at the
time.121 Since then, advances in mechanical engineering,
computerization, and software design have enabled the
development of sophisticated devices that address many types of
medical problems.122 This advancement is reflected in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s broad definition of a
medical device:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including
any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease . . . or intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body . . . 123

This definition limits the scope the FDA is permitted to take
by focusing only on devices that help heal or otherwise affect a
patient’s body as opposed to the constellation of devices that
support a health provider’s practice.124 Working within these
limitations, the FDA provides guidance to device manufacturers
and healthcare providers on medical device cybersecurity.125
This “total lifecycle product approach” places the FDA in the role
of supervisor—monitoring device manufacturers to see if they
market products with robust security protections, and whether
or not they continue to update the devices with post-market
patches.126 Importantly, however, some software functions are
expressly excluded from this definition.127 The FDA tries to
reduce the risk that dangerous devices are sold, in part, by
2009, at 20, https://www.morganlewis.com/~/media/files/publication/outside
%20publication/article/fdli_medicaldevicedistribution_may-june2009.ashx.
121. Cf. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1803 (1996) (“Most medical equipment,
such as leg braces and wheel chairs, posed little risk to patients.”).
122. See Carol Rados, Medical Device and Radiological Health Regulations
Come of Age, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History
/ProductRegulation/ucm2017808.htm (last updated Feb. 1, 2018).
123. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2016).
124. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060, 130 Stat. 1033,
1130 (2016) (clarifying the definition and excluding some medical software).
125. Suzanne Schwartz, FDA’s Role in Medical Device Cybersecurity, FDA
BLOGS: FDA VOICE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php
/2017/10/fdas-role-in-medical-device-cybersecurity/.
126. Id.
127. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h); see also 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114255, § 3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 1130 (2016).
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requiring medical device manufacturers to demonstrate the
safety of their products before selling them.128 In connection with
this function, the FDA often issues guidance and
recommendations to manufacturers.129 The FDA also has the
authority to take remedial steps: if a device manufacturer
discovers that its FDA-cleared product is unsafe, it must convey
this information to the FDA, which then may take various
regulatory actions including notifying the public or recalling the
product.130
The backbone of the FDA’s compliance framework for
medical devices is a classification system comprised of three
levels—Class I, Class II, and Class III—each of which signify the
level of risk a device presents, and the corresponding level of
oversight required.131 According to guidance published by the
FDA, Class I devices require only compliance with “general
controls” that apply to all classes of medical devices.132 Such
controls include, for instance, good manufacturing practices or
labeling requirements. The safety of Class II devices, by
contrast, requires information not captured by the general
controls that apply to Class I devices—for instance, evidence
that the device meets specific performance standards or
guidelines promulgated by the FDA.133 Such information may be
included within a premarket notification document (often called
a “510(k)” document), demonstrating that the device to be
marketed presents a low risk to consumers.134 The safety of
128. Schwartz, supra note 125.
129. Id.
130. Cf. Merrill, supra note 121, at 1808. As Richard Merrill explained in a
landmark paper on FDA oversight of medical devices, since the 1970s, the FDA
has had the authority “to ban worthless or dangerous products
administratively, and to require notification, replacement, and/or refund by
makers of defective products.” Id.
131. Charlotte A. Tschider, Enhancing Cybersecurity for the Digital Health
Marketplace, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 20–21 (2017), http://www
.annalsofhealthlaw.com/annalsofhealthlaw/vol__26_issue_1?pg=4#pg4.
132. FDA, THE 510(K) PROGRAM: EVALUATING SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE
IN PREMARKET NOTIFICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION
STAFF
2
(2014),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads
/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM284
443.pdf.
133. Id. at 2 n.2.
134. Id. at 2 n.1. Most Class II devices require the submission of a Premarket
Notification. See Overview of Device Regulation, FDA (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/
default.htm [hereinafter Device Regulation, FDA].
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Class III devices, meanwhile, cannot be determined from general
controls or from additional submissions relating to performance
standards alone.135 These devices must receive FDA approval
before they can be commercialized.136 The FDA classifies new
medical devices—i.e., devices marketed after the Medical
Devices Amendments of 1976 that are not substantially
equivalent to a legally marketed device—as “Class III” by
default.137 As Charlotte A. Tschider has explained: “How the
device is used and its connection to sustaining human life (in
comparison to diagnostic or therapeutic uses) determines its
final classification.”138
In some respects, it easy to evaluate how a typical
pacemaker system would be examined under this framework:
The FDA has established and published classifications for
approximately 1,700 generic medical devices, including
pacemakers.139 For instance, implantable pacemaker pulse
generators, programmers used by doctors, and pacemaker repair
or replacement materials are all classified under the regulations
as “Class III” devices requiring FDA approval.140 By contrast,
devices used to test the proper functioning of a pacemaker are
categorized under Class II, requiring only compliance with
general controls and performance characteristics.141 Likewise,
electrical chargers used to wirelessly recharge the battery in a
pacemaker are defined as Class I devices, requiring only
compliance with general controls prior to commercial sale.142

135. Id. at 2.
136. FDA, supra note 132, at 2.
137. Id. at 3. See also Device Classification Under Section 513(f)(2)(De Novo),
FDA (May 7, 2018), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn
/denovo.cfm (describing “an alternate pathway to classify new devices into Class
I or Class II that had automatically been placed in Class III after receiving a
Not Substantially Equivalent (NSE) determination in response to a 510(k)
submission”).
138. Tschider, supra note 131, at 21.
139. Classify Your Medical Device, FDA (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.fda
.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDe
vice/.
140. 21 C.F.R § 870.3610 (2017). Most Class III devices require the
submission of a Premarket Notification. See Device Regulation, FDA, supra note
134.
141. 21 C.F.R. § 870.3630 (2017). Most Class II devices require the
submimssion of a Premarket Notification. See Device Regulation, FDA, supra
note 134.
142. 21 C.F.R. § 870.3670 (2017).
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The FDA’s oversight of software in a pacemaker system is
more difficult to evaluate, however, and could be less rigorous
than its evaluation of physical devices.143 The FDA has long
regulated certain kinds of software, and certain software
functions are explicitly excluded from the FDA’s definition of
medical devices altogether. Against that backdrop, however,
Congress recently passed legislation that indicates the FDA
may, in its discretion, regulate software critical to patient
health.144 This suggests at the very least that algorithms
(implemented in software or firmware) designed to detect
abnormal heart rhythms or firmware controlling the generation
of electrical pulses would likely be regulated “devices.”
The evaluation of smartphone apps is less certain, however.
In 2015, the agency published a document that set out to clarify
“the subset of mobile apps to which the FDA intends to apply its
authority.”145 The document explains that it plans to regulate
“[m]obile apps that are an extension of one or more medical
devices by connecting to such device(s) for purposes of
controlling the device(s) or for use in active patient monitoring
or analyzing medical device data.”146 This strongly suggests that
an app used in connection with a pacemaker could be a regulated
device. However, the FDA has indicated that it “may” decline to
regulate “[m]obile apps that provide patients a portal into their
own health information, such as access to information captured
during a previous clinical visit or historical trending and
comparison of vital signs (e.g., body temperature, heart rate,
blood pressure, or respiratory rate).”147 Ultimately, it seems that

143. Similar uncertainty looms over the FDA’s oversight of other medical
devices. In a 2002 article, Julia Scheeres reported on the FDA’s finding that a
small implantable microchip did not qualify as a “medical device” under the Act,
and consequently, did not fall under the FDA’s classification system. The device,
Scheeres explained, had long been used to tag animals before more recent
applications involving human users had been explored. Julia Scheeres, ID
Chip’s Controversial Approval, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2002, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2002/10/id-chips-controversial-approval/.
144. 21 U.S.C. § 321; see also 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255,
§ 3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 1130 (2016).
145. FDA, MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.fda.gov
/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-meddev-gen/documents/document
/ucm263366.pdf (last visited Feb 13, 2018) [hereinafter FDA, MOBILE
GUIDANCE].
146. Id.
147. FDA, MOBILE GUIDANCE, supra note 145.
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the FDA will not categorically regulate apps distributed for use
with pacemakers; rather, whether a pacemaker app will be
regulated, and the degree of regulation it might receive, will be
determined in an ad hoc fashion, depending on the specific
functions of the app.
Beyond the classification and regulation of devices, the FDA
has treated cybersecurity concerns in pacemaker systems with a
light touch. The agency has shown a preference for issuing
general guidance rather than mandating security standards or
subjecting devices to rigorous testing. In a 2005 advisory
publication, for instance, the FDA laid out a largely hands-off
approach to cybersecurity risks presented by off-the-shelf
software, assuring manufacturers that there is typically no need
to report software patches to the FDA prior to supplying such
patches to consumers and doctors.148 In 2014, the FDA published
new cybersecurity guidance focused on how device
manufacturers can best prepare their devices for
commercialization.149 Like the 2005 document, these guidelines
were not legally enforceable, instead reflecting only the agency’s
“current thinking” on the topic.150 The document encouraged
device manufacturers to “consider” cybersecurity risks and
reasonably preventative steps such as authentication systems to
ensure that only authorized users and software can access
devices. The FDA cautioned, however, against overly
cumbersome security measures that “could unreasonably hinder
access to a device intended to be used during an emergency
situation.”151 In addition, the FDA encouraged device
manufacturers to describe in premarket notifications any steps
taken (e.g., design considerations and related analyses) to
reduce cybersecurity risks.152

148. FDA, Cybersecurity for Networked Medical Devices Containing Off-theShelf (OTS) Software (Jan. 14, 2005), https://www.fda.gov/downloads
/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm0778
23.pdf.
149. FDA, Content of Premarket Submissions for Management of
Cybersecurity in Medical Devices Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug
Administration Staff (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.fda.gov/downloads
/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm356190.
pdf.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Acknowledging that cybersecurity risks cannot be
eliminated entirely through premarket steps alone, the FDA
published a set of post-market guidelines in 2016.153 Like the
2014 document, these guidelines contained non-binding advice
and suggestions. The guidelines advised manufacturers to
“establish, document, and maintain throughout the medical
device lifecycle an ongoing process for identifying hazards
associated with the cybersecurity of a medical device, estimating
and evaluating the associated risks, controlling these risks, and
monitoring the effectiveness of the controls.”154 A theme
throughout the document was the need for manufacturers to
make and follow clearly documented plans and procedures
aimed at reducing patient risks: “Manufacturers should have a
defined process to systematically conduct a risk evaluation and
determine whether a cybersecurity vulnerability affecting a
medical device presents an acceptable or unacceptable risk.”155
Relevant to pacemaker manufacturers, the 2016 postmarket guidelines offered advice on when new reporting to the
FDA is necessary for software patches. The document explained
that “regularly scheduled security updates or patches to a device,
including upgrades to the software, firmware, programmable
logic, hardware, or security of a device to increase device
security, as well as updates or patches to address vulnerabilities
associated with controlled risk” are considered by the FDA to be
“enhancements” rather than “repairs” and, consequently, do not
require notification.156 By contrast, software patches that
address urgent threats to patient safety—i.e., “where there is
unacceptable residual risk of patient harm due to [the absence
of additional] risk mitigations”—must be reported to the FDA.157
In exchange for allowing manufacturers to manage postmarket
security, the guidance states that the FDA strongly recommends
manufacturer adoption of effective cybersecurity practices—
notably, the NIST Framework for critical infrastructure.158
153. See generally FDA, supra note 21.
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). While uncontrolled risks require more
disclosure requirements, the FDA explicitly states that they do not intend to
enforce reporting requirements for remedied vulnerabilities that meet certain
requirements, such as active participation by the manufacturer in an ISAO. Id.
at 23.
157. Id. at 12.
158. Id. at 27–30.
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In light of the recent revelations about pacemaker
vulnerabilities, legal commentators have criticized the FDA for
not taking a firmer stand on cybersecurity. One commentator
recently summarized the FDA’s posture in this regard as follows:
Indeed, the FDA heavily relies on guidance to oversee software.
Agency documents that summarize the FDA’s approach generally cite
to the same cluster of five guidances. Together, these documents form
a cascade of quasi-regulation, recommendations, and “current
thinking,” but offer few firm rules. Software does not stand on terra
firma with the FDA.159

This comment is representative of a vein of recent scholarly
criticism directed at the FDA’s reliance on guidance in place of
notice and comment rulemaking.160
This brief look at pacemaker security suggests that at least
some level of concern is well-founded: recent security reports
have clearly documented security flaws in pacemakers that have
been widely sold and installed by doctors. These flaws are highly
technical, but an engineering degree is not needed to understand
their sources: modern pacemaker systems rely upon complex
supply chains, sophisticated software, along with Internet
control and access. To help address them, the FDA entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Health
Information Sharing and Analysis Center and the Medical
Device Innovation, Safety, and Security Consortium. By
“enabl[ing] an operational framework for medical device
vulnerability information-sharing,” the partnership allows the
FDA to continue to stay abreast of vulnerability fixes that are
not subject to the premarket review process.161 This approach is
consistent with the information sharing approach adopted by
other departments such as DHS’s Critical Infrastructure
159. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 175, 194 (2014).
160. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Guidance Gone Wild? FDA’s Regrettable Retreat
From Legislative Rulemaking, 30 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Oct. 9, 2015)
(“Although the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) plainly allows for the
practice, the agency may have gotten a little carried away with this mechanism,
and, at times, it improperly treats these guidance documents as if they were
regulations adopted after notice-and-comment rulemaking.”); Browning &
Tuma, supra note 72, at 671 (“In fact, a legitimate criticism could be levied that
up
until
very
recently,
the FDA was
more
concerned
about cybersecurity measures interfering with an IMD’s utility. For example,
in 2014 the FDA alerted manufacturers that cybersecurity measures should
not ‘unreasonably hinder’ a device’s function.”).
161. Cybersecurity, FDA (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices
/DigitalHealth/ucm373213.htm.
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Protection162 and the Treasury’s FinCEN Exchange for financial
crimes.163
These observations are all the more concerning when
considered alongside the FDA’s preference for an advisory role
on cybersecurity matters and its somewhat vague indications
concerning future oversight of software. In summary,
cybersecurity risks to pacemakers are likely higher than
consumers might wish, but the FDA appears disinterested at
present in adopting a more assertive stance. But, it is not the
only game in town.
D. HIPAA SECURITY RULE
Regulation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in the
healthcare arena comes from two primary sources, FDA
regulation and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule.164 This section
discusses why HIPAA’s security rule may be a useful tool for
regulators seeking to secure a covered entity’s network. It is
important to note that HIPAA’s Security Rule may apply to
regulation of the medical IoT supply chain in a roundabout way.
The Security Rule requires appropriate measures be taken to
safeguard any electronic protected health information (PHI).165
IoT devices that do not meet the definition of medical devices do
not generally store PHI, making the security rule seem
inapplicable.166 That is, unless one accounts for the attack vector
that insecure IoT devices provide. For example, should a hospital
install smart thermostats or lights, those IoT devices would
understandably avoid any application of the medical device
definition. However, because the thermostat is connected to the
hospital’s network, it provides an avenue for attackers to
infiltrate the network and gain access to the PHI stored within.
162. Information Sharing: A Vital Resource for Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/information-sharing-vital-resource.
163. FinCEN Launches “FinCEN Exchange” to Enhance Public-Private
Information Sharing, FINCEN (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.fincen.gov/news
/news-releases/fincen-launches-fincen-exchange-enhance-public-privateinformation-sharing.
164. 45 C.F.R. 160; 45 C.F.R. 164(A); 45 C.F.R. 164(C); The Security Rule,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (May 12, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa
/for-professionals/security/index.html.
165. Id.
166. See id.
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In this way, the Security Rule can fill in the gaps left by the
narrower definition of medical devices.
While the Security Rule only applies to covered entities,
such as healthcare providers, and does not apply to medical
device manufacturers,167 it may nonetheless help spur device
manufacturers to design with security in mind. If a healthcare
provider does not feel that a given IoT device is secure enough,
and, for example, could open them up to liability for a breach of
the security rule, they will likely decline to allow the device on
their network. As health providers continue becoming more
sophisticated and savvy about their overall network security,168
medical device manufacturers and regulators should consider
the impact of the Security Rule on IoT devices in the healthcare
supply chain as part of a broader universe of reforms needed.
E. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT
If a device manufacturer is not one of HIPAA’s covered
entities, and the IoT device does not meet the definition of a
medical device,169 a manufacturer may still be subject to the FTC
Act. In fact, the FTC sees its role as co-partners with the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), filling in the
gaps where HIPAA is absent: “Indeed, the FTC Act is currently
the primary federal statute applicable to the privacy and
security practices of non-HIPAA covered businesses that collect
individually identifiable health information.”170 As a result, it is
highly relevant to any study of cybersecurity in the healthcare
context.
The FTC has adopted a reasonableness standard for
regulating the security practices for non-HIPAA covered
entities.171 In this way, unlike HIPAA’s binary approach,
industry norms have the potential to affect federal enforcement
167. Covered Entities and Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/coveredentities/index.html.
168. See infra Part IV(C).
169. That is, the device is not part of the diagnosis, cure, or treatment of a
medical condition—such as an Apple Watch or other health monitor.
170. Thomas Pahl, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Cybersecurity & the Healthcare
Industry: The FTC’s Tools for Tackling New Threats, Opening Remarks Before
the University of Maryland Medical Systems Board Cybersecurity Retreat 4
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements
/1229863/pahl_-_umms_opening_remarks_3-29-17.pdf.
171. “In the data security world, all roads lead to reasonableness.” Id. at 3.
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practices. The FTC Act’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive
trade practices”172 results in enforcement against companies
that break their promises to consumers through a failure to
implement “reasonable” security practices or by going beyond
the scope of consent.173 Generally, these failures occur as the
result of a data breach, but are just as likely to stem from
security failures in IoT devices.174
The reasonableness standard means that following FTC
recommendations can help device manufacturers avoid liability.
In 2017, Acting Director Thomas Pahl’s recommendations
included: (1) “don’t misrepresent the level of security you
provide”; (2) “protect against well-known, foreseeable threats”;
and (3) “take advantage of” guidance issued by federal
agencies.175 The FTC’s earlier IoT report in 2015 provided
specific security guidelines including “security by design,”
promoting a culture of security, secure third-party service
providers, “defense in depth,” and reasonable access control
measures.176 It is likely that as implementation of these
practices and others become industry norms, failure to adopt
them will place non-HIPAA covered entities in unreasonable
territory—risking FTC scrutiny.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND
POLICYMAKERS
Despite the efforts of U.S. regulatory agencies, particularly
the FDA, as has been made clear, there are security gaps
remaining that, in some cases, are being filled by industry codes
of conduct. This final Part examines the extent to which industry
norm entrepreneurs can succeed where other stakeholders have
thus far failed to secure vulnerable medical devices, particularly
pacemakers. The Part begins with an overview of industry best

172. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
173. See, e.g., In re PaymentsMD, LLC, 159 F.T.C. 241 (2015) (decision and
order) (punishing collection of data beyond the scope of consumers’ consent); In
re Rite Aid Corp., 150 F.T.C. 694 (2010) (decision and order) (punishing Rite
Aid’s corporate policies which failed to secure PII).
174. Pahl, supra note 170, at 6.
175. Id. at 7–8.
176. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
A CONNECTED WORLD 28–31
(2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
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practices before taking a deep dive focusing on the experiences
of AdvaMed and Eskenazi Health and concluding with an
analysis of global developments as they pertain to cybersecurity
due diligence.
A. A LOOK AT MEDICAL INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY BEST
PRACTICES
When it comes to best practices, we must remind ourselves
that they are just that—practices rather than rules. Yet as more
and more medical devices are created to connect with one
another, the increase in connectivity enlarges the risk to data
and increases the value of cybersecurity weak points for those
with malicious intent. That being said, the ever-changing
landscape forces medical device companies, healthcare delivery
organizations, and the industry in general to be conscious
contributors in putting forth recommendations and enacting
security-prone changes on the individual level177 to constantly
spur ideas on how to take positive prophylactic measures.
Today, the public’s expectations for medical devices’
capabilities far exceed those of earlier times.178 Whereas early
devices were standalone, today’s are connected to a broad
ecosystem, as discussed in Part III. Users can, and oftentimes
desire to, connect to their healthcare providers, biomedical
engineers, or other devices to provide a cumulative and
comprehensive view of their health to others participating in
delivering the highest levels of care.179 But the cost of this
exponential connectivity creates many points susceptible to
cybersecurity threats in various stages, ranging from the chain
of device creation and production, to connecting with healthcare
providers and entities, to performing the device’s intended
function. The preceding section on adapting the NIST CSF and
following FDA pre- and post-market guidance provide some of
the strongest defense mechanisms in the campaign against
cybersecurity threats, but this section aims to further detail best
practices as seen in the industry of medical devices specifically.
Starting with the inception of a medical device,
manufacturers can and should have the foresight to understand

177. See infra Part IV(C).
178. See generally HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE,
supra note 10.
179. Id.
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the type of data and environment(s) in which their products
intend to hold, create, transmit, or store information.180 In our
current climate, the best practice approach to gauging what
information should be protected is to have the assumption “that
assets requiring protection will always be under threat.”181
Many industry authorities, private and government, promulgate
the concept that testing for risk and safety analyses throughout
the lifecycle of manufacture is a critical way to detect and
mitigate present and future threats and vulnerabilities.182 The
best way to plan for an inevitable cybersecurity threat is to
embed defensive infrastructure during the design phase(s),
rather than posing threats and recovery options as
afterthoughts; in other words, the best firms build in
cybersecurity from the start, they do not bolt it on as an
afterthought.183 Industry professionals have supported
strategies to secure medical device software through
strengthening the operating system and implementing security
technologies like firewalls.184 From a physical standpoint,
manufacturers should minimize attack surface of devices
requiring them to contain the minimal components needed for
design as well as closing any ports that would otherwise remain
open.185 Every phase throughout a medical device’s life, from
creation to disposal, needs to be tested and accounted for in
terms of risks.
The responsibility of designing and building secure devices
can be executed through contractual agreements deferring
responsibility to manufacturers rather than consumers, whether
180. Fubin Wu & Sherman Eagles, Cybersecurity for Medical Device
Manufacturers: Ensuring Safety and Functionality, 50 BIOMED.
INSTRUMENTATION & TECH. 23, 25–26 (2016), http://s3.amazonaws.com/rdcmsaami/files/production/public/FileDownloads/BIT/2016_BIT_JF_Cybersecurity
Manufacturers.pdf (explaining cybersecurity risk analysis).
181. Id.
182. See generally HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note
10; Wu & Eagles, supra note 180.
183. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 38;
Kevin Fu & James Blum, Controlling for Cybersecurity Risks of Medical Device
Software, HORIZONS, Spring 2014, at 38, http://s3.amazonaws.com/rdcmsaami/files/production/public/FileDownloads/HT_Cybersecurity/2014_HorSpr_S
oftware_Risks.pdf.
184. Ron Mehring & Axel Wirth, Medical Device Patch Management:
Factors for Strategy and Execution, Speech at HIMSS Conference (Mar. 1,
2016), http://www.himssconference.org/sites/himssconference/files/pdf/20.pdf.
185. Id.
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that be hospitals or other types of healthcare delivery
organizations. Contracts that put the responsibility to design
information security and privacy standards on manufacturers
will place the onus on the medical device industry to take
cybersecurity into consideration at all levels of product research
and design, hopefully in greater emphasis than what attention
is dedicated to cybersecurity now.186 Through these
responsibility agreements, every system level of a medical device
can be penetration-tested during the design and manufacture,
even verified with certification, to ensure the integrity, security,
and privacy of the device before it is released on the market.187
If weaknesses or flaws are revealed throughout the process,
consumers can work with manufacturers, in order to stress and
uphold the principles of protecting patient safety and the
integrity of the technology.
Once on the market, manufacturers should not be let off the
hook in terms of assessing for potential threats and
vulnerabilities. Assuming a medical device is securely designed
and even more so in the event the device was not assessed for
risk during its design, manufacturers should be involved with
their healthcare delivery organizations in the lifecycle
management of their medical devices. Best practices for
manufacturers should include constant monitoring of threats
and vulnerabilities to their devices in production and on the
market, and then reporting such detected threats and
vulnerabilities to their consumers and affected public.188 Patches
need to be developed by manufacturers in response, then need to
be sent to the appropriate channels that can deploy them among
the threatened devices to mitigate any risks moving forward.189
As was discussed in Part II, patching is easier said than
done, but it is critical to maintaining an up-to-date secure
medical device. For best practices purposes, disseminating and
implementing patches by both the manufacture and healthcare
delivery organization in a timely fashion is of the utmost

186. Ron Ross et al., Security Systems Engineering (NIST Special Pub. No.
800-160, 2018), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP
.800-160.pdf (summarizing cybersecurity best practices for building
trustworthy systems).
187. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 19.
188. Mehring & Wirth, supra note 184, at 20.
189. Id.
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importance.190 A delayed patch deployment may result in a
situation such as Wannacry; the patch that would have
prevented the Wannacry incident was released over a month
prior to the attack yet was not deployed by hospital
administrators.191 Granted, deploying patches in hospital
operating systems may be relatively easy in comparison to
certain medical devices (i.e. ones implanted in the human body),
the same concept applies in that patching sooner than later is in
the interest of the patient’s safety. Industry professionals
recommend, and some healthcare delivery organizations have
gone as far as, to implement a patch management program,
“triaging” risks and determining the order of patch deployment
according to network and data exposure, likelihood of a breach
occurring, and the potential impact it could have on the entity.192
Patching is even more important when considering the
actual lifespans of medical devices. There is a common
misconception that, because new medical devices are always
being developed, these new products are being quickly adopted.
In reality, medical devices (along with Electronic Health Record
systems) are being used, in some cases, anywhere from ten to
twenty or more years due to budgetary restraints faced by
hospitals.193 Operating systems may be newer or updated more
frequently, but the vendors that supply the devices or their
respective patchwork may have been developed according to
previous versions of operating systems;194 such misalignment
jeopardizes strategic plans to secure the full lifecycles of medical
devices. Thus, maintaining a relationship with vendors and
manufacturers to provide the latest software updates compatible
with the healthcare delivery organization or the medical device
itself is crucial in protecting the longevity of devices.195 Further,
as long as the software patch is designed to address security
issues and does not change the function of the medical device,
manufacturers will not be burdened by having to attain
190. Id.
191. Mike Kelly, Cybersecurity Best Practices for Healthcare Companies, J.P.
MORGAN CHASE & CO. (June 1, 2017), https://commercial.jpmorganchase.com
/pages/commercial-banking/industry-expertise/cybersecurity-healthcarecompanies.
192. Mehring & Wirth, supra note 184, at 23.
193. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 28.
194. Id.
195. Patch Management Tips Every HDO Should Know, AAMI (July 25,
2017), http://www.aami.org/newsviews/newsdetail.aspx?ItemNumber=4873.
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recertification or approval by the FDA; as was discussed in Part
III, manufacturers only need to test the patch to ensure it does
not have negative outcomes on the device.196
Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities will occur no
matter how much a product is designed to withstand an attack
or whether it is updated like clockwork with respect to
appropriate patches. Security incidents will happen, but, at the
very least, manufacturers should have a vulnerability disclosure
policy in the event that an attack threatens the public safety of
its consumers.197 In October 2016, on the heels of the St. Jude
pacemaker issues coming to light, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) may
have been the first in its industry to proactively come forth in
issuing a warning to patients about the “cyber vulnerability” of
their OneTouch Ping insulin pumps.198 The medical devices at
stake were insulin pumps that connect to the patient’s body and
inject insulin through catheters controlled by a wireless
remote.199 Due to the device’s communication not being
encrypted, testing confirmed that a hacker could manipulate the
pump to dose insulin, thus posing potentially life-threatening
consequences.200 While J&J believed there were no attempted
hacks on any of the 114,000 patients who used the OneTouch
Ping, J&J decided to warn all those patients and provide advice
on how to fix the problem.201 Ultimately, the FDA lauded J&J
about their forthcomingness, supporting the hopeful transition
from companies and organizations generally hiding negative
“cyber vulnerabilities” to the practice of executing disclosure
procedures about confirmed threats.202 It should be best practice
to disclose warnings and follow-up recommendations to remedy
medical device vulnerabilities “in a way that best protects
patients.”203
Again, despite the lengths taken to assess and mitigate
cybersecurity risks in design and through constant patching,
cyber attacks are inevitable, and much is still to be learned about

196. Id.
197. Mehring & Wirth, supra note 184, at 20.
198. Jim Finkle, J&J Warns Diabetic Patients: Insulin Pump Vulnerable to
Hacking, 23 No. 17 WESTLAW J. MED. DEVICES 6 (2016).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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how to best react to adverse events. Information sharing as an
industry-wide best practice has the potential to assist all types
of healthcare organizations: large and small, public or private.
Institutions like the National Health Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (NH-ISAC) enable any non-profit or for-profit
healthcare stakeholder—including healthcare providers,
insurers, biotech firms, laboratories, medical schools, medical
device manufacturers, and more—to participate in a “forum for
sharing cyber and physical threat indicators, best practices and
mitigation strategies.”204 NH-ISAC’s goals include securing
personal health information and complying with standards and
regulations in HIPAA to further protect patient safety and lives
while our world continues progress in healthcare through
medical devices and such technology.205
Regardless of whether one is a voluntary member of NHISAC, information sharing can be helpful for any organization or
healthcare stakeholder. Creating a baseline of information on
cybersecurity risk management that any size or type of
healthcare organization can tailor to their needs is a start.206
Many healthcare organizations are small-to-medium-sized
businesses that lack the staff, resources, and infrastructure to
combat a potential cybersecurity incident, but if an information
sharing system were in place, these smaller entities could
greatly benefit whether in receiving information about real-time
threat indicators or using the strategies of cybersecurity experts
at other healthcare organizations that have already faced
similar scenarios.207 To have strength in numbers and share
these strategies, the FDA has recognized the need for
transparent dialogue, and, thus, does not intend to enforce
certain reporting requirements of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act for companies that voluntarily participate in
specific institutions, including the NH-ISAC.208
Ultimately, though, even if best practices are implemented
by norm entrepreneurs, there will still be a gap, resulting in a

204. NH-ISAC and MDISS Partner to Form Medical Device Security
Information Sharing Initiative, NH-ISAC (June 14, 2016), https://nhisac.org
/events/announcements/nh-isac-and-mdiss-partner-to-form-medical-devicesecurity-information-sharing-initiative/.
205. Id.
206. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 51.
207. Id. at 50–51.
208. NH-ISAC, supra note 204.
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lack of mandatory requirements to hold medical device
manufacturers or healthcare delivery organizations accountable
for security lapses. Between the FDA covering safety and
effectiveness, HHS’s enforcement of HIPAA, and the Joint
Commission’s Standard for Medical Equipment Safety, medical
devices only need to abide by floor standards to avoid statutory
breaches rather than being required to invest in proactive
cybersecurity best practices.209 While medical device
cybersecurity legislation has yet to be passed, in 2017, the HHS’s
Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force encouraged
healthcare providers to collaborate among departments;
including leadership, biomedical engineering teams, IT staff,
and IT security, when it comes to the selection, deployment, and
maintenance of medical devices.210 The Task Force promotes the
creation of a Medical Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(MedCERT) within healthcare organizations, with teams
specifically concentrated on medical devices to focus on potential
impacts to patient safety when vulnerabilities to medical devices
are disclosed and/or exploited.211 The establishment of
MedCERT teams is designed in the interest of protecting
national security, as they would be the “go-team[s]” in the event
of a medical device exploit tasked with “assess[ing]
vulnerabilities, evaluat[ing] any patient safety risks, serv[ing]
as an adjudicator between the vulnerability finder and the
product manufacturer, assess[ing] proposed mitigations, and
serv[ing] in a consultation role for organizations navigating the
coordinated vulnerability process.”212 Just as privacy concerns
exploded in the 1990s, in response to which HIPAA designated
mandatory privacy officers in all healthcare organizations,213
MedCERT might be the teams created in response to the rising
levels of cyber threats to medical devices.
Looking ahead, the multi-faceted cyber threat to medical
devices will likely continue to increase as the IoT universe

209. For more on this topic, see Amanda N. Craig, Scott J. Shackelford, &
Janine Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory
Analysis, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 722 (2015).
210. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 33.
211. Id. at 34.
212. Id.
213. Office for Civil Rights, Summary of HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html.
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expands. Public and private entities have already joined forces
to innovate on the subject, such as the Medical Device
Innovation Safety & Security Consortium (MDISS). Established
in 2010, MDISS is a nonprofit, public/private partnership, and
the first of its kind to focus exclusively on medical device
cybersecurity.214 Under a 1.8 million dollar contract with the
Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity Division,
MDISS has built a medical device cyber risk assessment
platform furthering the collaboration and sharing of critical
information between stakeholders like healthcare organizations,
medical device manufacturers, technology firms, and even the
NH-ISAC.215 Moreover, in 2017, MDISS built over a dozen World
Health Information Security Testing Labs (WHISTL), in which
the “facilities will comprise a federated network of medical
device security testing labs . . . . Enabling MDISS members to
test devices in both physical and virtual environments, WHISTL
facilities will focus on identifying and mitigating medical device
vulnerabilities, sharing solutions and best practices, and device
security education and awareness.”216 Successes of the
organization’s initiative have been tangibly measured in
participant hospitals, including efforts by Eskenazi Health and
its respective Certified Biomedical Equipment Technician
Manager/Clinical Engineer, Benjamin Esslinger, which is
shared later in greater detail.217 The mission and goals of
organizations like MDISS exemplify and execute best practice
standards in upholding the cybersecurity of medical devices—
from testing and developing safety protocols, sharing
information on how to mitigate and react to threats, and even
recognizing and acting on the importance of cross-collaboration
between public, private, and government efforts—these
practices help promote a future state in which expected cyberattacks can be mitigated. Already, through the work of MDISS—
along with AdvaMed, highlighted next—real progress is being
made.

214. See MDISS, MDISS, https://www.mdiss.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2018).
215. MDISS Launches ‘Whistl’ Network of Security Testing Labs for Medical
Devices, MDISS (July 27, 2017), https://www.mdiss.org/news/mdiss-launcheswhistl-network-of-security-testing-labs-for-medical-devices.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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B. ADVAMED ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
This section focuses in particular on the efforts of AdvaMed
within the wider context of organizations working on the topic of
healthcare cybersecurity. To be clear, AdvaMed is far from alone
in this ecosystem. The Medical Device Manufacturers
Association (MDMA) and the Medical Imaging and Technology
Alliance (MITA) are also important partners, but the latter
focuses mostly, unsurprisingly, on imaging technologies. Yet this
group has important power when it comes to medical device
cybersecurity due to the fact that it is a standards body. In
particular, the Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical
Device Cybersecurity is an important data point in helping to
frame a standard of cybersecurity care for medical device
firms.218
AdvaMed works with these groups on different policies and
leads in particular on policy matters given its deep interaction
on Capitol Hill and with the FDA. In particular, AdvaMed’s
Cybersecurity Foundational Principles have been influential,
both in the U.S. and abroad. These Principles were developed in
the aftermath of the Muddy Waters Report involving St. Jude
pacemakers discussed above.219 There was some haste in
developing these principles, according to Rothstein, meaning
that some important issues like supply chain cybersecurity did
not necessarily get the attention they deserved; in fact, “supply
chain” is not even mentioned in the Principles. But these
foundational principles, which are in turn based on the NIST
CSF, will, in time, be expanded. “I would anticipate supply chain
being within the next two issues that we tackle as an industry,”
said Rothstein.220
Best practices like the AdvaMed Principles can be spread
more quickly by the advent of new information-sharing
organizations, like the new Healthcare Coordinating Council
under NH-ISAC.221 The Council is intended, according to

218. Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security
(MDS2), HEALTHCARE INFO. & MGMT. SYS. SOC’Y, http://www.himss.org
/resourcelibrary/MDS2 (last visited Jan. 24, 2018); see generally Shackelford et
al., supra note 12.
219. See MW Is Short St. Jude Medical (STJ:US), MUDDY WATERS RES.,
http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/research/stj/mw-is-short-stj/
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2018).
220. Interview with Zach Rothstein, supra note 8.
221. NH-ISAC, supra note 204. For more on NH-ISAC, see supra Part IV(A).
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Rothstein, to “coordinate all of the different players in the
healthcare community in relation to cybersecurity.”222 This
group is also likely to take on the issue of supply chain
cybersecurity risk management in the medical device context,
perhaps even more so than AdvaMed given that it is comprised
of associations rather than individual members.223 As Rothstein
explains, “it can be tough to tackle cross-cutting issues like
supply chain cybersecurity with diverse members like Intel and
Medtronic playing in the same pool.”224
Rothstein does not think that new legislation is needed in
this space—at least on the security side.225 Rothstein, however,
has expressed one exception: “When it comes to cybersecurity,
Congress could help with federal structure, particularly at
establishing a more hierarchical structure at HHS.”226 Such a
move would reportedly be well-received by AdvaMed members
and the broader healthcare community, particularly in the
confusion after Spectre and Meltdown, and earlier WannaCry,
came to light.227 According to Rothstein: “That’s where Congress
could really help out.”228 Rothstein further stated: “Two-factor
authentication doesn’t make sense across the board—yes for in
the home, not necessarily in operating rooms where seconds
matter—but I think we need to establish an appropriate, clear
federal structure to meet these threats.”229 Even though this is
unlikely in the near term, AdvaMed reports that the group is
just as busy in 2018 as they were during the Obama
Administration’s second term, with new substantive rules
coming from the FDA, including an update on premarket

222. Interview with Zach Rothstein, supra note 8.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.; Simon, supra note 33. Spectre and Meltdown are the names given
to different variants of the same fundamental underlying vulnerability that
affects nearly every computer chip manufactured in the last 20 years and could,
if exploited, allow attackers to get access to data previously considered
completely protected. Simon, supra note 33. The flaw was discovered in late
2017. Id. There are three variations on the vulnerability; two of the variants are
grouped together as Spectre and the third is deemed Meltdown. Id.
228. Interview with Zach Rothstein, supra note 8.
229. Id.
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cybersecurity activities to reflect current best practices for
designers that currently dates to 2014.230
C. ESKENAZI EXPERIENCE
When reviewing the role played by industry best practices
in medical device cybersecurity, it is helpful to include the
perspective of a leading hospital system. Eskenazi Health is
based in Indianapolis, Indiana, has been in operation for nearly
160 years, and currently provides treatment to nearly one
million outpatients annually.231 The system opened a new 315bed hospital in 2013,232 which required a large amount of
procurement. During that phase, “the focus was not
cybersecurity of medical devices, it was on getting a hospital
started,” according to Benjamin G. Esslinger, Clinical Engineer
Manager of Eskenazi.233 To help allay any resulting
cybersecurity concerns, Eskenazi has used a variety of tools to
help secure its Internet of Medical Devices.234 The hospital
bifurcates the responsibility for security between the IT systems
touching Eskenazi’s networks and the biomedical engineering
department that assesses the security of procurement.235 In
particular, the engineering department utilizes the Medical
Device Risk Assessment Platform, which is also aligned with the
NIST CSF, and takes the form of a pre-procurement
questionnaire to ensure that new medical devices meet a
minimum-security baseline.236 According Esslinger, however, it
is still necessary to prioritize mitigation strategies for the most
vulnerable devices.237
One element that helps improve security across Eskenazi’s
networks is the fact that they do not have a test environment;
instead, the hospital system relies on manufacturers obtaining

230. See supra note 149.
231. See ESKENAZI HEALTH, About, http://www.eskenazihealth.edu/about
(last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
232. See ESKENAZI HEALTH, History, http://www.eskenazihealth.edu/about
/history (last visited Jan. 24, 2018); see also ESKENAZI HEALTH, About, supra
note 231.
233. Interview with Ben Esslinger, supra note 9.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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an approved patch238—echoing concerns discussed in Part III
about this aspect of medical device cybersecurity. And even
though partitioning networks can help cordon off threats, there
is also the concern of “death by segmentation” in which every
network has to be on its own network. Replacing a whole
network of devices is not an option given the large outlay that
would take. And there are still larger industry problems to
address. According to Esslinger: “Manufactures are still selling
devices with unsupported operating systems. So, in that case,
how do you mitigate the threat?”239 The unspoken answer seems
to be through best practices in procurement, and sharing
information with peers. In fact, Eskenazi shares best practices,
including with regards to procurement, through the MDISS
(MDRAP) Community of Practice, and the Indiana Biomedical
Society through educational workshops.240 Yet information is
not readily attainable by manufacturers, underscoring the need
for healthy two-way communication to promote due diligence in
the Internet of Healthcare.241
D. A GLOBAL NOTE
These are dynamic times when it comes to global
cybersecurity policy with important new laws in the European
Union and China unsettling the status quo. First, in the EU, the
General Data Privacy Directive (GDPR) and the Network
Information Security (NIS) Directive both have far-reaching
implications for IoT regulation generally, and medical devices in
particular.242 Similarly, the new Chinese cybersecurity law will
likely impact the medical device industry, but it is unclear as of

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Similar critiques have been made about public-private information
sharing schemes in other cybersecurity contexts. See Elaine Lammert, The
Public-Private Partnership: A Two-Way Street, CIPHER BRIEF (Jan. 24, 2016),
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-public-private-partnership-a-two-waystreet.
242. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters
Attack: Enhancing the ‘Security of Things’ Through Polycentric Governance,
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415 (2017); Philip Piletic, EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation Set to Disrupt the Medical Industry, HEALTH IT OUTCOMES (Aug.
29, 2017), https://www.healthitoutcomes.com/doc/eu-s-general-data-protectionregulation-set-disrupt-medical-industry-0001.
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this writing to what extent that will be the case.243 These
disruptions will make it more difficult in the near term to make
much progress on global harmonization of cybersecurity best
practices as applied to the Internet of Healthcare generally, or
medical devices in particular. From the perspective of
AdvaMed’s members, though, the U.S. has maintained the best
regulatory regime, driven by the FDA.244 According to Rothstein:
“They’ve been really engaged with industry, but also with the
broader ecosystem (including with hospitals, even though they
don’t regulate them).”245
But as for the potential of blockchain to enhance medical
device cybersecurity, Rothstein, at least, is not yet convinced:
“From what I’ve seen so far, I don’t think that blockchain will be
a game-changer for the healthcare system.”246 However, he
hedged his conclusion a bit with the insight that healthcare
organizations often follow the movements of major financial
firms, saying: “So, if more financial firms start to incorporate
blockchain, will likely see that flow into healthcare.”247 The
rapid pace at which the financial industry is embracing
blockchain, then, may push the healthcare sector to similarly
explore its applications, including in the supply chain context.248
More exciting at present, at least for Rothstein, are the prospects
for machine learning and artificial intelligence, which are topics
deserving of further research in the healthcare context.249

243. See Scott J. Shackelford & Frank W. Alexander, China’s Cyber
Sovereignty: Paper Tiger or Rising Dragon?, POL’Y F. (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-cyber-sovereignty/; Mini vandePol & Fun
Hui, New China Cybersecurity Guidelines for Registration of Networked Medical
Devices, BAKER MCKENZIE (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.bakermckenzie.com
/en/insight/publications/2017/03/new-china-cybersecurity-guidelines/.
244. Interview with Zach Rothstein, supra note 8.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., 5 Blockchain Technology Use Cases in Financial Services,
DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/financial-services/articles/5blockchain-use-cases-in-financial-services.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2018).
249. For more on how this movement could impact cybersecurity, see BEN
BUCHANAN & TAYLOR MILLER, MACHINE LEARNING FOR POLICYMAKERS: WHAT
IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS (2017), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default
/files/files/publication/MachineLearningforPolicymakers.pdf.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored cybersecurity vulnerabilities in
the healthcare sector with a particular emphasis on the thorny
problem of managing supply chains. As we have seen, new
technologies like blockchain can help manufacturers and other
healthcare stakeholders mitigate cyber risk, but only to a point.
In the end, it is vital for these organizations to take lessons from
other firms like J&J and invest in proactive cybersecurity best
practices while taking cybersecurity seriously as part of its
corporate social responsibility.250 This is part and parcel of an
ecosystem-based approach to security the Internet of Healthcare
drawing from analogies such as sustainable development in an
effort to promote cyber peace. As more organizations embrace
such a proactive approach discussed in Part IV, they can become
norm entrepreneurs, as Eskenazi Health and AdvaMed have
done, establishing “new normative standards” for industry.251
Eventually, after a tipping point is reached, such bottom-up
efforts could catalyze positive network effects and even cause a
“norm cascade” in which normative standards, in this context
cybersecurity best practices related to supply chain
management, become internalized and perhaps eventually
codified in national and international laws benefiting global
cybersecurity through polycentric action.252
In some respects, supply chains are like living organisms:
externally, they look like self-contained entities, but internally,
they are multifarious systems that depend upon the proper
functioning of many invisible sub-systems. Vulnerabilities in
these sub-systems don’t tend to announce themselves. Disease
can long lay dormant and then strike without warning. As a
consequence, there is no quick or simple way to make medical
device supply chains more robust and impervious to attack. But
as challenging as it is, the problem’s implications for public
250. See Shackelford, supra note 31.
251. ANNEGRET FLOHR & KLAUS DIETER WOLF, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CORPORATIONS AS NORM-ENTREPRENEURS 10 (2010).
252. See Neal K. Katyal, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: The
Network/Community Harm of Crime, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
CYBERSECURITY 193–94 (Mark F. Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006)
(exploring network effects and network externalities in cyberspace); Martha
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895–98 (1998) (describing the three stages of “the
norm ‘life cycle,’” including “norm emergence,” “norm cascade,” and “norm
internalization.”).
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health demand our attention, resources, and creativity.
Blockchain is unlikely to be a panacea, but it seems worth
exploring as part of a package of technological advancements
and regulatory reforms aimed at securing the Internet of
Healthcare.

